What about Lukashenko?

 

There was, we must assume, some secret deal between Putin and Prigozhin. We do not know what it was. Part of it was probably making Putin’s portion in the deal look better in public than in reality: Putin would need this to stay in power, and would probably trade off other things for it.

But what about Lukashenko, who brokered the deal?

He has agreed to let an alien armed force, possibly up to 25,000 strong, relocate to his territory. That looks risky. What is in it for him?

Perhaps, seeing Putin fading, he is turning to Prigozhin as backup in case of popular revolt. Best to have foreign troops: they are less inhibited about shooting local civilians.

He does risk Prigozhin seizing power in Belarus. No doubt he is counting on the Russian’s focus remaining on Moscow, the bigger prize.

But even if so, Prigozhin might do better at taking Moscow if he combined his own force with the army of Belarus.

Perhaps then, rather than risk this, Lukashenko has actually agreed to join forces voluntarily with Prigozhin at some point in this venture. A promise to do so may have been what clinched the deal: Prigozhin could have gone in immediately with the force he had at hand, or waited to go in later with the Belarussian army at his side.

From Prigozhin’s point of view, Belarus is conveniently close to Moscow. He can martial here and wait his moment.

For Putin, the deal might have been worth making, even knowing this aspect of it, to allow him to organize his exit, with guarantees from Lukashenko and Prigozhin for his personal safety and security and a comfortable retirement. And who knows? Given a little more time, circumstances might also turn in his favour.

We shall see.