More North Korean Hijinks

A friend of mine, ex-USAF intelligence, has asked me for my opinion of the significance of the recent North Korean bombardment of the South.

I'm flattered. Now I feel obliged to come up with something.

Some day, my son, all this will be yours.

What is pretty certain is that the North Korean government is not trying to start a war. If they were ever to have any chance to win a war with the South, it would only be on a quick and massive surprise attack. They have no reserves, no supply train, no industrial strength to resupply, and virtually no spare parts. Over time once battle was joined, the South would gain strength from new US forces landing, as in the 50s, while the North would be vulnerable to blockade at sea and probably cannot count on China to keep land supply routes open—no raw materials nor fuel. Blitzkreig is their only winning strategy, if they have one. The worst thing to do then, would be to give the South protracted prior warning before full hostilities began.Which is what this incident would do, if it were meant to provoke a war.

So the action is intrinsically irrational, given that it indeed amounts to an act of war by normal measures.

Several possible reasons for such recklessness have been advanced:

1. To show the toughness of young Kim Jong Un, to convince the military that he his fit to lead.
2. To blackmail the rest of the world into sending more aid.
3. As a move in some kind of internal struggle over power.

I think Option 1 is the least likely. Is it self-evident that making reckless use of force is going to impress the military? Wouldn't it be just as likely to convince them that Jong Un is nuts? Who knows the odds of winning the war better than the top military? Why do people always assume that military men want war? They're the ones most likely to get killed (or found wanting) when it happens.

Besides, why would anyone near the top or on the street suppose that the decision was really made by Jong Un, as opposed to his semidivine father or some other power behind the throne on his behalf? I note too that the North Korean press has played down the incident internally. If it were meant to build up Jong Un among the public, it would be played up.

Option 2, that it is a bid to get more aid, seems more plausible. That's been the North's standard MO in the past. It would be just another stickup in a series; and it is hard for hardened criminals to break the easy-money habit. Certainly, there seem to have been other recent deliberate attempts to get the world's attention. Last March, there was the actual sinking of a South Korean warship. Just a few days ago, US scientists were gratuitously given a tour of North Korean centrifuges, revealing that the North's uranium enrichment program was far more advanced than previously thought. And I still believe—along, I learn, with Glen Beck, who claims US military sources have privately confirmed this—that the mysterious “contrails” off LA last week were a missile, and I think most likely a North Korean one.

And the government of the South has recently been playing tough, and cut off the aid the North had come to depend on.

That may be enough to explain it. Given that the North has cried wolf before so many times, and given that they are now dealing with a “get tough” government in the South, they may have made the judgement that it is necessary this time to rattle the sabres that much harder.

Still, to me, this smells a bit desperate. How confident can they be that they will not instead provoke exactly the opposite reaction? My thesis, therefore, is that the North's situation might be rather more desperate than we realize—deperate enough that it seems a worthwhile gamble to risk more severe sanctions or even war for the hope of getting more aid.

That, however, leads to Option 3. Frankly, in the past, the government of the North has made it quite clear by their actions that they did not especially care if the people were starving. They weren't. Their only concern was to stay in power. Accordingly, even mass starvation in itself would not matter now. And if the government were worried about unrest in the general population, the thing to do would again be to play up instead of play down the incident in the internal press, to unite the people (and the common ranks of the military) behind the present leadership for fear of a common enemy.

But the people do not matter.

What would matter in a palace power struggle is having goodies to hand out to key supporters, for use or resale at a profit. So the apparent desperation seems to suggest a power struggle with an uncertain outcome is going on, in which a few more bottles of scotch or sacks of aid rice here or there might make all the difference.

We know for sure that Kim Jong Il and Jong Un are on one side in this struggle; we cannot tell who is on the other side. Perhaps they cannot either.

The military is always the body best poised for a coup, just about anywhere, let alone in North Korea, where it is bigger than everything else put together. But presumably any aid coming in would be in the hands of Jong Il, Jong Un, and the present government powers, in the first instance. If the recent military actions are to scare up aid, that suggests instead that at least a significant part of the military is still fully in their control. Helping them acquire aid would necessarily be to the detriment of the opposition faction—so the military, or portions of the military, in energetically helping them acquire aid, must be with them.

The other possible power base is the secret police; they could pull off something by stealth, and here the odd bottle of Johnny Walker or Napoleon cognac could matter most. They might also be able to arrange it so that the aid fell into their hands. Not so easy, though; they could perhaps take down the present leadership, but any new man stepping in would need the instant support of the military to stay in power. Who would have the stature? Wouldn't the response of the top military instead be to immediately enforce their own claims instead? And if stealth is needed for the plan to work, they could hardly be doing something so public as shelling the next country down.

It seems most likely therefore that this is all not about a present struggle, but an anticipated and imminent one. For now, the government of North Korea is apparently still more or less in control. But we already know Kim Jong Il is close to death. This, along with the recent revelation of the centrifuges, and the sinking of the Cheonan, might be a sort of of chess opening for an anticipated difficult struggle for the succession, by the backers of Jong Un. The missile launch, if it was that, could work in the same way—not just to possibly scare more bucks out of the US, but also to scare up some fast buyers for the technology. They may want some money in their hands in time to secure the succession with strategic bribes.

In sum, it looks as though those in power in Pyongyang are expecting Jong-Il to die soon, probably in a matter of a year or two, if not less, and they are expecting all hell to break loose as soon as he does.

Perhaps so should we.

If this ananlysis is correct, I think it is also a bad idea to give in and send any aid. If anyone does, it will not help the general population; it will help the government stay in power. As, no doubt, it always has. Wouldn't it be better for all concerned if the present regime fell, even if that involved a little chaos? Given how bad this government is, don't we have nowhere to go but up?

Of course, it also ensures future provocations, by rewarding such conduct.