The Chamber of Sober Second Thought

 

Senator Richards illustrates the possible value of an appointed senate, and what it is supposed to be: wiser heads unconnected with electoral politics, able to take the long view. Peter Hitchens is a strong proponent of this view.

The Senate probably saved us from the Emergency Act after a few days. It might save us from C-11.

Perhaps the thing to do is to keep the Senate more or less as it is, but have Senators appointed not by the Prime Minister, but by the members of the Order of Canada. Governors-General and Lieutenant Governors could be similarly selected—as David Johnston was under Stephen Harper. One great advantage of this approach is that it would require no changes to the constitution or even necessarily any legislation.

Alberta Swings Left

The Alberta election yesterday is an example of how strange the results can be in a “first past the post” (so-called) electoral system like our own. To be sure, there was a major swing from right to left in the popular vote. The combined left-of- centre vote went from 19.74% in 2012 to 44.76% of votes cast in 2015. That's significant. Nevertheless, the NDP win hinged too on a collapse of the Liberal Party and a surge by the Wildrose. The left of centre vote was united behind one party, and the right of centre vote was evenly split in two, so that the NDP was able to come up the middle. Based on raw votes, which is to say, the actual popular will, the government of Alberta would still be to the right of centre: you will note that 44.76 is still less than 50%. The Wildrose plus the PCs took 52.01% of all votes, and the tiny Alberta Party another 2.28%. Instead, the election has produced an absolute majority for a party that is not even centre-left, but left-left, on the Alberta political spectrum: not the moderate Liberals, but the out-there NDP.

Change in government is good, and Alberta was overdue. But lurches like e this are probably not. They make it hard for businesses and individuals to plan for the future.

This seems to me to illustrate the argument for my own proposal for the Canadian senate. One could do something similar, after all, on the provincial level. Leave the lower house elected as now, by riding; and add an upper house elected province-wide, or nation-wide, by proportion of the popular vote, without ridings.

Why? In the first case, because it would more accurately reflect the popular will, ensuring that all voices are heard. In the present case, assuming, for simplicity, a 100-member upper house, the result would be 41 NDP members in the upper house, 28 PCs, 24 Widrose, 4 Liberals, and 2 Alberta Party, with one Green. In other words, while the NDP would be the largest bloc, it would be a minority government there. The right wing would have a majority in the upper house.

This would also work towards stability, reducing sudden lurches in government policy.

A problem with bicameral legislatures generally is that they can cause deadlock. This is also a problem with proportional representation, as it makes it much more difficult for any one party to get a majority. My proposal would avoid this: only the lower house would have the power to initiate bills. The upper house, on the other hand, would have solely the power to rescind bills previously passed, which had been in effect for a set time period. Even if this time period were just a year, this would allow the lower house to budget on its own.

This would prevent any direct clashes between the two houses, and allow a majority government in the lower house to get on with the practical business of government. There would be no fiscal crises like the recent budget battles in the US. But there would still be a check on government actions.

The idea of ridings is, on the whole a good one. It is a way to protect geographically-based minorities from being run over roughshod by majorities. On the other hand, it does this by short-changing any minorities that are not geographically based. The upper house could handle that: you will note that it gives increased representation to minority parties like the Alberta Party and the Greens. In Canada, our problem tends to be regionalism; we could use such a unified chamber as a corrective. A regional grouping like the Bloc Quebecois would have much smaller representation in this upper than the current lower house. Giving more voice to minority parties, in turn, would encourage their formation, allowing more voices to be heard in parliament and in our public affairs, without the political splintering and ever-changing coalitions one sees in nations like Israel or Italy. There would be a point in voting NDP even if you knew they could never win your local riding.

This form of upper house would also give parties the opportunity to protect star candidates whose talents they consider vital to their success, or their success in government. Such protection would in turn lure more people of high calibre into public life.

Not incidentally, the structure I propose would naturally lead to legislation being regularly rescinded. This corrects a problem with the current system: now, all the incentive is to add new legislation, never to repeal old legislation. As a result, government naturally grows larger and larger, which is not the best thing to have happen. Better to have a balance here.

In the meantime, Albertans, get ready for a rocky ride. Ontarians went through something like this a generation ago, when their longstanding PC government was supplanted first by the Liberals, and then the NDP. It was a less dramatic swing than this one, and I think most Ontarians would now agree that it did not turn out terribly well.  

Reforming the Canadian Senate

Nobody really likes the Canadian Senate as it is, except sitting Prime Ministers. Yet it has never been reformed, because it is an ideal opportunity for patronage appointments. It also serves some small use as a way of getting a desired person into cabinet who does not have a Commons seat.

On the left, the NDP wants to abolish it. On the right, the old Reformers and Westerners commonly want a “Triple-E” Senate on the American model: elected, equal, and effective. Equal here meaning equal representation for each province. This would boost Western representation in Parliament.

To my mind a Triple-E senate is a non-starter. There is no constitutional justification for it. In the US, sovereignty resides with the states. In Canada, the provinces are supposed to be creatures of the federal government. As for accommodating regional differences, a Triple-E senate in Canada would reduce minority representation, rather than enhance it, by drastically reducing the voice of Quebec in federal affairs. In democratic terms, a Triple-E senate is an abomination: it gives one Prince Edward Islander over 100 times the influence of one Ontarian. And a bicameral legislature in which either house can introduce legislation is a perfect recipe for constant crisis. What if one party holds a majority in one house, and another party in the other? Witness, for example, the US's current negotiations over the debt ceiling. Worse, a foreign government can negotiate a treaty with the US President, in good faith, and then it turns out not to be passed by the legislature. The US has always been able to get away with this kind of gridlock and unreliability, first because it was so isolated from the rest of the world, and now because it is so powerful. A smaller, less influential country may not be able to afford it.

There is nothing wrong, on the other hand, with simply abolishing the Senate. Other than the fact that no sitting Prime Minister is ever likely to do it, because it is so convenient for patronage.

Here's an alternative proposal. First, make the Senate a national body elected by a national vote, by proportional representation, from party lists.

The riding system already represents the regions. What we do not have, in Canada, is a body of individuals—or even one individual, with the possible exception of the Queen or Governor-General--who represents the interests of the federation as a whole. This promotes division in a federation rather prone to division. The Senate, in this elected form, would do precisely that. Each senator would be answerable to the national electorate as a whole, and would have to face them again next election.

The proportional representation model might also let minority voices be heard that are not in the first-past-the-post system. At present, a party like the Greens can get eleven or twelve percent of the vote nationwide, yet not hold a seat.

This form of Senate has, I think, some chance of getting passed by a party in power, because it does not completely remove the patronage function of the current senate. It simply spreads it out among the different party leaders, so that there is more ideological diversity. A valuable player or a revered war horse could be more or less assured a seat by placing them at the top of the party lists for the Senate elections.

This still does not address the issue of gridlock between the two chambers. For that, I offer part two of my proposal: assign a different legislative role to each house. The Commons could continue as at present, initiating legislation. The Senate would have only the power to repeal.

This would eliminate any direct conflict between the chambers. It eould, however, give the Senate an effective veto over any legislation, retaining its historical mission as a place of “sober second thought.” And it would do something more, and something worth having a separate chamber to do. At present, the tendency is for laws and government to just keep piling up, extending further and further. This, as Ibn Khaldun pointed out hundreds of years ago, is what causes most nations and dynasties to eventually collapse. We would have a chamber dedicated to preventing this.